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The third of four scheduled Inter-Governmental Conferences on the conservation and sustainable use of marine
biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction met in New York in August 2019. This article tracks the progress made
in the negotiations, focusing on the four key themes the draft treaty is addressing: (1) marine genetic resources,
(2) area-based management tools, including marine protected areas, (3) environmental impact assessments, and
(4) capacity building and transfer of marine technology. Drawing on process tracing (i.e. observations, in
terviews, and literature analysis), we have observed several critical issues in the emerging institutional design of
a future agreement for ‘Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction’ (BBNJ). These include the continued ideo
logical polarization between existing ocean governance principles (‘freedom of the seas’ and ‘common heritage of
mankind’), disagreements about the delegation of authority to existing or created institutions, uneven partici
pation of scientific and industry stakeholders, and the challenge of formulating a legal instrument that relies on
inchoate or inconsistently used concepts. The conclusion looks ahead to the fourth Inter-Governmental Con
ference, and assesses the potential of reaching an effective agreement before the negotiations are scheduled to
conclude in April 2020.

1. Introduction
“The new instrument must end governments’ grabs in the high seas”
-Malawi on behalf of Least Developed Countries, opening statement
8/19/191fn1
Covering three fourths of the earth’s surface area, the ocean is the
world’s largest ecosystem. Areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ),
incorporating the high seas and the international seabed, comprise more
than sixty percent of it. Nearly ten million tonnes of fish are harvested in
this region annually, with an estimated landing value of US$16 billion,
or 15% of total global marine landed value [1]. The legal framework for
ocean governance in ABNJ is not operating in a void, however it is
largely fragmented and uncoordinated, resulting in a patchwork of

regulatory schemes covering issue areas from the protection of migra
tory birds, to deep sea mining, to the dumping of illegal wastes from
ships, to pollution from land-based sources. There are at least 190 multiand bi-lateral agreements addressing a range of issue areas that affect
the ocean, not including other forms of global governance, such as
customary international law, working practice, or informal rules [2]. As
a result, biodiversity protection has somewhat ‘slipped through the
cracks’ of ocean governance, especially for the ABNJ [3], and there are
also concerns about effective and equitable conservation on the high
seas, as evidenced by the quote from Malawi, above.
In September 2018, following over a decade of informal efforts, the
international community began a formal process of negotiating a new
international legally-binding and over-arching instrument to address the
conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity beyond national
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jurisdiction (referred to here as the BBNJ negotiations), in line with
United Nations General Assembly’s (UNGA) Resolution 72/249.2 The
BBNJ negotiations are structured around four main sets of issues: (i)
marine genetic resources, (ii) area based management tools, including
marine protected areas, (iii) environmental impact assessments, and (iv)
capacity building and the transfer of marine technology. These issues
represent the basic mandate of the BBNJ negotiations, which is to pro
duce a single agreement that covers them all. This mandate is restricted
by the proviso that any new agreement “should not undermine” relevant
existing frameworks, bodies, and instruments [4]. UNGA Resolution
72/249 stressed the need for the widest possible participation and the
use of consensus-based decision-making.
The third of four scheduled Inter-Governmental Conferences (IGC-3)
on BBNJ took place at the United Nations headquarters from August
19–30, 2019. Unlike the previous two conferences, the IGC-3 negotia
tions focused around draft text produced by the President of the nego
tiations, Rena Lee of Singapore, released to delegations and the general
public on July 25th, a few weeks in advance of the meeting. This draft
text was publicly praised by nearly all delegations during the start of the
third meeting, and it substantially changed the tenor, pace, and detail of
interventions compared with the first two meetings (see Refs. [4,5]). At
the meeting, many delegations circulated text-based proposals, which
were updated and re-circulated throughout the conference. In the dis
cussion below, these are referred to as Conference Room Papers (CRPs),
which were made available electronically to delegates. Despite a lack of
significant progress in IGC-3, and privately-expressed concerns about
the timeline, there was no formal discussion about whether additional
IGCs would need to be scheduled beyond the fourth and final IGC in
March 2020.
IGC-3 also differed from the previous two conferences with regard to
format. Whereas all issues were discussed in plenary informal working
groups in IGC-1 and IGC-2, with full access for intergovernmental and
nongovernmental organizations (IGOs and NGOs), and which were
webcast so that those not at the meeting could follow along, IGC-3
included fourteen “informal informals,” which took place in a smaller,
more closed session. In general, more contentious issues were scheduled
to be discussed in the informal format. These informal informals were
not webcast, press were not allowed, and the attendance by NGOs and
IGOs was limited to ten total seats. In some small ways, this reduced
accessibility extended to state delegations as well. For example, meet
ings often ran over time, meaning that interpretation services were
discontinued and discussion proceeded only in English. And for the first
time at these negotiations, the advent of informal informals and ad hoc
changes in scheduling resulted in four sessions overlapping, which
greatly disadvantages smaller delegations that may not have enough
people to be present at multiple simultaneous sessions [6]. At the same
time however, parallel sessions, especially informal discussion-oriented
arenas, can foster compromise and dialogue in a way that is less possible
in more formal arenas.
While the informal informals intended to move the negotiations
forward by providing a lower-stakes atmosphere for working out com
promises, and they were fairly transparent in allowing observers to be
present, in practice they seemed very similar to the plenary informal
working groups with regard to content. Discussions about specific terms
like “established,” “designated,” and “existing” took up significant
amounts of time, while polarized debates about the applicability of
principles such as ‘freedom of the seas’ and ‘common heritage of
mankind’ continued. The most notable effect, and unintended conse
quence, of the informal format may in fact have been to reduce the
visibility and influence of NGOs and IGOs, who were not invited to

speak, and who had to jockey amongst themselves for a limited number
of seats. In fact, during IGC-3 we recorded NGOs and IGOs speaking a
total of only 37 occasions (during plenary working groups). In contrast,
during IGC-1 and IGC-2 they spoke a total of 69 and 85 times,
respectively.
This article is the third in a series that seek to identify important
variables shaping the negotiations, describe developing trends with re
gard to consensus building, and comment on the obstacles and chal
lenges facing delegates. Our overall research question is examining the
factors that can explain the prospects for and design of the final BBNJ
agreement. Our analysis of IGC-1 explored whether and how the desire
to maintain and expand national jurisdiction shapes the emerging BBNJ
instrument [5]. Our analysis of IGC-2 considered whether and how the
pre-existing ocean governance regime constrains or enables the nascent
BBNJ agreement [4]. In this analysis, we explore how the negotiations
seem to have reverted back to the dichotomy between the common
heritage of mankind and the freedom of the seas, despite attempts to set
these principles aside in favor of less polarized alternatives, and how we
therefore appear to be stuck in the middle, with not much time left
before the BBNJ instrument is due to be completed.
2. Methods
The findings presented in this analysis are part of a larger, on-going
project addressing the governance of BBNJ. Our analysis draws on semistructured interviews, participant observation at the conference
(including working group interventions and side events) and related
“process tracing”, which aims to identify sequences and patterns that
support the development of theoretical ideas. Our overall goal is to
construct an explanatory narrative that sheds light on the BBNJ process
and outcomes, in particular the factors that explain the final outcome of
the negotiations, placing them within the larger literature on regime
creation and effectiveness [7,8]. We also conducted a desktop analysis,
reviewing documents connected to the meeting, e.g. statements, official
documents, and CRPs circulated at the conference, containing delegates’
draft language changes and amendments, as well as Earth Negotiations
Bulletin reporting and other reports from IGOs, NGOs, and the media.
Quotations provided in this paper are from a dataset we developed and
have been building at the IGCs, and have been verified with written
statements and video, where available. At the request of the BBNJ
conference leadership, this analysis does not draw directly from our
observations of the informal informals. These sessions were attended as
much as possible by the authors, however, in order to follow overall
trends in the topic discussions.
The processes we are tracing represent influences on the emerging
institutional design of the BBNJ agreement. The nature and content of
regime design is critically important to achieving the effective gover
nance of marine biodiversity, therefore tracing the factors that influence
the design process can be useful for producing explanations about why
particular regimes succeed or fail. Although the BBNJ regime is still
coming into being, the framework for analyzing regime features pro
vided by Ref. [9] provides a useful guide for categorizing and charac
terizing various proposals and trends. They argue that international
agreements can be viewed as ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ depending on their degree
of precision, obligation, and delegation. Without prejudging the suit
ability of hard or soft institutional forms for BBNJ governance, we use
this framework to support our analysis of the emerging BBNJ regime
design. In general, we found that debates over the level of precision
required and the degree of obligation and delegation that states found
acceptable pervaded the negotiations.
3. Overarching issues

2

UN General Assembly Resolution 72/249 on an International legally bind
ing instrument under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on
the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas
beyond national jurisdiction (A/RES/72/249), 24 December 2017.

“We must keep in mind not to … create any new obstacles to fishing
or fisheries”
2
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- Iceland on application of MGR provisions, Working Group on MGRs, 8/
23/19

intervening. Five different member states spoke on behalf of the PSIDS
this time, and the coalition intervened on every major issue. Their po
sitions - which emphasize the delegation of authority to new bodies, the
rights of adjacent coastal states, and special recognition of SIDS status
(small island developing states) - seemed increasingly isolated or distinct
from the interventions of other states and some other coalitions.
The polarization between supporters of the principles of common
heritage of mankind (CHM) and freedom of the seas picked up again
during IGC-3, after a lull in IGC-2. As before, this ideological dichotomy
was particularly vocalized in the discussions around MGRs and echoed
many of the same challenges discussed during the negotiations of Part XI
of UNCLOS [34], circling the divergent goals of developing and devel
oped nations [14–16]. Although participants at the UNCLOS negotia
tions had already committed to the CHM principle to govern the
resources of the international seabed (the Area), it took many years of
heated debate to agree on what exactly that meant for access to and
exploitation of seabed resources [17]. Eventually, a compromise was
reached for UNCLOS wherein all states could access and exploit the
Area, subject to a management and benefit sharing regime administered
by the newly-created International Seabed Authority (ISA). The
compromise was not ideal for any of the countries, however, and it
became a major issue for the United States in particular, even credited
with being the reason for the United States’ refusal to ratify UNCLOS
[18,19]. Historically, maritime powers like the United States, United
Kingdom, and Soviet Union preferred the application and expansion of
the ‘freedom of the seas’ principle to ensure their continued ability to
exploit ocean spaces and resources. These same general patterns of
disagreement about the applicability and meaning of each principle
persist in the BBNJ negotiations.
It appeared that the President hoped to side-step this debate, as the
draft text did not include an explicit reference to either principle
(although some articles did reflect parts of the CHM concept). Devel
oping states emphasized its importance in their opening statements.
Palestine, speaking on behalf of the 134 state members of the G77/
China, asserted that the overall goal of conservation and sustainable use
of marine biodiversity in ABNJ “can only be achieved when guided by the
bedrock principle of CHM” (G77/China opening statement, 8/19/19).
Algeria, speaking on behalf of the African Group, said that without an
explicit statement of the CHM principle, the agreement would be “like
putting a ship in the water without a navigational instrument” African Group
opening statement, 8/19/19. Malawi, speaking on behalf of the Least
Developed Countries, concurred that the ABNJ as a whole must be
recognized as the CHM. Despite these clear group statements, individual
delegations also felt a need to stress the central importance of the CHM
principle, including Cameroon, Egypt, Eritrea, India, Iran, Myanmar,
Nicaragua, the Philippines, Thailand, and Sudan. This deep commitment
to the CHM principle among developing states was evident throughout
the issue-specific discussions, and the revised draft text for IGC-4 now
includes an explicit reference to CHM in Article 5 on general principles
and provisions.
Despite this disagreement about guiding principles, other issues were
less contentious. For example, there was broad agreement across the
package that a BBNJ agreement should only create obligations for state
parties. For example, delegations roundly rejected the idea that pro
ponents of a planned activity (which would often include private com
panies) should be responsible for determining whether an EIA is
necessary. Avoiding provisions that directly obligate non-state actors is
typical for international agreements, which overwhelmingly focus on
international cooperation between states, but many delegates also
expressed concern about the wisdom of letting companies self-regulate.
The International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC) - the only clear
industry voice represented during IGC-3 - repeatedly stressed the
importance of involving industry in review or guidance functions, by
proposing the addition of “sectoral stakeholders” and “sectoral exper
tise” in different parts of the text. Although the ICPC representatives
remain actively engaged in direct informal talks with national delegates,

Overall, some interesting trends were observed at IGC-3, including
continued disagreement over certain issues, as well as new and emerging
issues and players. IGC-3 revisited core themes from the first two IGCs,
emphasizing the need for an “effective, practicable and future-proofed
implementing agreement for the conservation and sustainable use of marine
biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction” (European Union dele
gation’s opening statement, 8/19). This recognition of the need for
future-proofing was echoed by Tuvalu on behalf of the Pacific Small
Island Developing States (PSIDS), who noted that the agreement should
be neither too prescriptive nor too broad, leaving too much to be
determined by subsequent Conferences of Parties (COPs), which could
delay implementation. The United States also warned against deferring
too much decision-making to the COP or any new institution, but for a
different reason: to ensure that member states would not be bound by
any decision not made in the context of these negotiations.
In addition, the continued restriction that this agreement “should not
undermine” existing approaches, which has run throughout the IGCs to
date, means that the BBNJ treaty will likely not have a hierarchical
relationship with other instruments [4,10,11]. In the revised draft text
for IGC-43, the positive framing of “promotes coherence and coordina
tion” was eliminated in favor of the simple “does not undermine”
framing (Article 4(3)). However, if the new treaty does not address the
myriad problems that have emerged since the United Nations Conven
tion on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was negotiated in the 1970s and
80s, it may not succeed. In May 2019, a few months before IGC-3, the
Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and
Ecosystem Services released a landmark assessment on the state of
global biodiversity [12]. The report painted a stark picture of global
biodiversity loss, indicating that a million species face extinction, many
within decades. Shortly after IGC-3, in September 2019 the Intergov
ernmental Panel on Climate Change released a “Special Report on the
Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate” [13] which highlighted
the dramatic effect that climate has already had on the oceans, including
ocean acidification, stratification, and oxygen loss. The importance of
these global assessments was not lost at the BBNJ negotiations; several
delegates, including the President, referred directly to them. However,
whether these larger threats are helping bring state parties together to
draft a strong agreement remains to be seen.
The visibility of individual delegations and coalitions also shifted
somewhat in IGC-3. Unlike in previous sessions, the representative of the
Holy See rarely intervened. The apparent reason for this shift was, in
their own words, a feeling that their past interventions, which were
intended to provide innovative middle ground solutions, were not
picked up by other delegations or reflected in the draft text. The two
largest coalitions - G77/China and the African Group - also expressed
fewer, and less detailed, consensus positions than in previous IGCs,
despite the dedicated efforts of their coalition leaders. The like-minded
Latin American states, newly rebranded as Core Latin American coun
tries (CLAM) at this IGC, emerged as a more forceful and focused group
compared to previous IGCs. A variety of states spoke on behalf of CLAM,
including Colombia, Brazil, Costa Rica, and El Salvador, and in a side
event, Honduras noted that the CLAM group was one of the most diverse
coalitions at the negotiations, in terms of country type. In their opening
statements, CLAM and the persistently vocal CARICOM (Caribbean
Community) noted the degree to which they shared positions. Among
the coalition groups representing small island states, the PSIDS (Pacific
Small Island Developing States) remained the most active, with AOSIS
(Alliance of Small Island States) and PIF (Pacific Island Forum) rarely

3
A revised draft text was released in November 2019 on the UN BBNJ
website for the forthcoming IGC-4 in March–April 2020 (accessed 25 January
2020) [https://www.un.org/bbnj/content/fourth-substantive-session].
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these positions still lack specific state supporters in the formal
interventions.

access to MGRs at all. Other states sought to apply the ‘freedom of the
seas’ principle by arguing that the initial in situ collection of MGRs rarely
has a commercial purpose, so that type of access is better understood as
marine scientific research, a topic which has already been established by
UNCLOS as an explicit - if undefined - freedom of the high seas (Article
87). In a debate that is very similar to the longstanding disagreements
about freedom of navigation in the territorial sea, the idea of prior
notification is seen as an unacceptable hindrance to some (such as
Japan, Korea, the United States, and Russia) while others find a simple
reporting procedure acceptable (such as the EU, Norway, Singapore, and
CLAM) [20].
The clash between ‘freedom of the seas’ and CHM could also be
discerned in the debate over the modalities of benefit sharing. Divergent
preferences on the draft text of Article 11 in the CRPs show polarized
positions. While the United States and South Korea accept voluntary,
non-monetary benefit sharing, the G77/China, CARICOM, and the Af
rican Group support mandatory sharing of both monetary and nonmonetary benefits. Both Norway and the EU took middle positions,
allowing for some mandatory sharing of non-monetary benefits. Each
option - voluntary and/or mandatory, monetary and/or non-monetary remains in the revised draft text for IGC-4, signifying a lack of movement
on this topic in IGC-3. This debate is closely tied to both the topic of MGR
access, which can itself be described as a benefit, and the CBTMT issue
area, which also contains questions about mandatory and monetary
transfers.
Another difference between IGC-3 and previous conferences was a
lack of emphasis on the potential riches and rewards associated with
commercialization of MGRs. Estimates of the monetary worth of MGRs
are highly speculative, given the inherent uncertainties of the research
and development process, and the continued lack of research on the
distribution and potential value of MGRs in ABNJ and national juris
dictions [21]. This situation creates a major challenge for consensus
building, because differing expectations about the potential benefits of
MGRs seem to be shaping the cost/benefit analyses of actors with regard
to the prospect of creating a heavy or rigid institutional architecture for
regulating access and benefit sharing. If you believe that major profits
are possible, especially in the near term, the risk of hampering scientific
research is worth the potential reward of a well-functioning regulatory
institution that ensures real benefit sharing. If you believe that a prof
itable scientific breakthrough from MGRs in ABNJ is unlikely or will
take a very long time, the cost of impeding or delaying scientific research
may seem unacceptably high. Although access and benefit sharing are
addressed in separate draft provisions, these two regulatory areas are
closely intertwined. Another example of this close connection concerns
the debate over whether “access” includes the ability to use digital forms
of genetic data, rather than just physical samples. Although regulating
access to in situ or ex situ physical samples may be simpler from a defi
nitional and practical perspective, the reality is that researchers and
companies increasingly use digital information about genetic material
that is often available in public databases [22].
Two communities that would be affected by the new rules for access
to MGR and benefit sharing had limited presence at IGC-3: the scientific
research community, and the industries that utilize genetic resources for
product development. Instead, delegates from developed states and
some NGOs would speak on behalf of the interests of these groups,
typically in broad-strokes comments about the risks and costs of deter
ring academic and commercial research. Some delegates - including
from developing states - referred to conversations with members of their
domestic scientific community in order to provide support for their
positions. Japan, for example, emphasized the need for scientists to
research water quality right away after a major maritime accident, and

4. Elements of the BBNJ package
In addition to these overarching issues, IGC-3 delved further into the
four key themes of the BBNJ. Working Groups and informal informals
were scheduled to deal with the four agenda items separately, and also a
fifth category of ‘cross cutting issues’ that included questions about
institutional architecture. Unlike previous IGCs, where a number of
contiguous days were assigned for each issue area, the IGC-3 schedule
inter-mixed different issues within single days. These issue areas are
treated as distinct in the draft text, and also in the analysis that follows.
4.1. Marine Genetic Resources4
“The principle of Common Heritage of Mankind, the polluter pays,
the principle of Common Heritage of Mankind, the precautionary prin
ciple/approach, the principle of Common Heritage of Mankind, equity,
did I mention the principle of Common Heritage of Mankind? the
ecosystem approach, best available scientific information and tradi
tional knowledge of indigenous peoples and local communities, and of
course the principle of Common Heritage of Mankind”
- Palestine, on behalf of the G77/China, on general principles and
approaches (Article 5), Working Group on Cross-Cutting issues 8/28/
19
The topic of Marine Genetic Resources (MGRs), and specifically the
creation of rules for access and benefit sharing, remains one of the most
contentious areas of the BBNJ negotiations. The most disputed draft
articles on MGRs were addressed during informal-informals: access,
benefit sharing, monitoring, and intellectual property rights. In part, this
is a result of obvious and on-going polarization between the positions of
the G77/China coalition and a group of developed states that includes
the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Russia. In general, the
countries most likely to have nationals engaging in MGR collection and
utilization in the near term are those which oppose additional burdens
on that activity, and the countries least likely to engage in MGR
collection and utilization tend to propose additional regulations and
regulatory institutions. Some countries routinely took more moderate
positions on MGR issues - such as Norway, Singapore, Canada, and the
EU - although their interventions tended to be closer to the antiregulatory pole. Although G77/China remained united that the CHM
principle should underlie the regime, and that benefit sharing should be
meaningful and significant, the coalition expressed agreement on fewer
details of the text compared to other issue areas. According to one
knowledgeable interviewee, this relative lack of consensus on MGR
topics is a result of both the rushed and changing schedule at IGC-3, and
substantive disagreements within the coalition itself.
Interventions on MGR-related topics did change in notable ways
compared to IGC-1 and IGC-2. The explicit clash between the principles
of ‘freedom of the seas’ and CHM faded into the background, and was
articulated less frequently, during the MGR discussions. This may have
been the result of having a draft text for the first time, and a draft text
which does not explicitly refer to either principle. But the overall clash
of principles still suffused the debate, as the representative from
Palestine regularly reminded delegates. The strongest and most explicit
version of the ‘freedom of the seas’ principle came from Russia, which
suggested that the treaty text should not include a provision regulating
4

The MGR portion of the draft treaty (Part II) addresses overall objectives
(Article 7), applications of the provisions (Article 8), activities with respect to
MGRs of ABNJ (Article 9) collection of and access to MGRs of ABNJ (Article
10), the fair and equitable sharing of benefits (Article 11), intellectual property
rights (Article 12), and monitoring (Article 13)
4
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4.2. Area based management tools, including marine protected areas6

concerns about the impact of prior notification requirements on their
ability to collect important data. Some NGOs and IGOs reminded dele
gates that existing institutional resources within the scientific commu
nity could assist in the process of access and benefit sharing, a point
which has been reiterated in the academic literature [23]. The limited
formal voice of the scientific community in these negotiations risks the
creation of MGR rules that are challenging to implement in practice. For
example, the very idea that there is a discrete and definable category of
‘marine genetic resources’ is not reflected in scientific research about
deep sea organisms, and neither is the distinction between ABNJ and
national jurisdiction genetic material [24]. More direct involvement of
the scientific community in the negotiations could mitigate the risk of
rules that are out of touch with scientific practice and concepts [25].
Researchers can also make a positive impact by voluntary disclosure of
the origins of genetic sequence data used in patents, to increase trans
parency and traceability for regulatory purposes, and to help reveal the
links between collection, access, and exploitation [22,26].
The topic of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) for MGRs is also
difficult to resolve, for three main reasons. First, it is difficult to
distinguish (legally or practically) marine scientific research from access
to and utilization of MGRs. Until the commercialization stage, the ac
tivities associated with the collection, storage, and analysis of MGRs are
essentially the same regardless of whether the intention is knowledge or
profit. And commercially-valuable MGRs can be identified from samples
that were not originally collected for that purpose [23]. Although ma
rine scientific research is not defined by UNCLOS, it is an explicit
freedom of the high seas (Article 87) and cannot constitute “the legal
basis for any claim to any part of the marine environment or its re
sources” (Article 241). So, any system that regulates access and/or al
lows patent claims over MGRs must distinguish them from marine
scientific research. Second, IPR regimes are typically designed to limit
access to patented items and information, to protect the interests of
investors and thereby encourage investment in research and develop
ment. This idea is in tension with the notion that a BBNJ agreement
should provide access to and share benefits from commercial products
based on MGRs. The major developing world coalitions strongly support
inclusion of an Article on IPR in the agreement, to ensure that the IPR
process for MGRs from ABNJ facilitates transparency, accountability,
and compliance, especially with benefit sharing provisions. Third, the
topic of genetic resources - how they are defined and how they can be
patented - is the current subject of two non-BBNJ negotiations, in the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD). The discussions in CBD concern the roles of
Digital Sequence Information in utilization and benefit sharing of ge
netic resources, while WIPO is hosting negotiations for an agreement
about the relationship between traditional knowledge and IPR.5
Although both forums explicitly limit the applicability of their agree
ments to ABNJ, the existence of other forums with related mandates, and
the desire for uniformity across international agreements, allows some
delegates to suggest that the BBNJ participants should delay, defer, or
displace decisions about the IPR aspect a regime for MGR in ABNJ.

“The Rio Declaration was in 1992 … colleagues we are in 2019 so I
think we should move forward”.
- Delegate from Switzerland, referring to the precautionary principle
versus precautionary approach, Working Group on ABMTs 8/21/19
Given this was the third time the international community had
formally come together to discuss the role of area based management
tools (ABMTs) including marine protected areas (MPAs) in the context of
BBNJ, it was somewhat disappointing that delegates continued to
struggle to define these tools and how they relate to one another. Most of
the state delegates who offered draft language in the CRP documents
proposed deleting portions of the definitions for ABMTs and MPAs
related to “affording higher protection than that provided in the sur
rounding areas” for one or both of these tools in Article 1 on Use of
Terms. Some also suggested removing “biodiversity” and/or “sustain
able use” from the definitions, such that an MPA would simply aim to
achieve “long-term conservation objectives.” But even the “long term”
was challenged, as Russia and others emphasized the need to re-evaluate
any designated ABMT after a certain time period, in order to prevent the
continuation of these tools after their goals have been achieved.
A related sticking point focused on the distinction between “estab
lishing” versus “designating” MPAs, with Canada, CLAM countries, the
G77/China, Iceland, the Philippines, and Turkey advocating for the
former, while the EU and Maldives preferred the latter. The relative
meaning of these terms in relation to one another within the context of
the developing agreement was not clear, and the US suggested
substituting both with “identifying” ABMTs and MPAs, while the IUCN
offered “adoption and implementation” as alternative language with the
clearest and least ambiguous meaning, which the international com
munity would be wise to agree on. This debate over wording remains
important, and points to the ongoing, wider need for internationallyrecognized definitions for MPAs [27]. It remains to be seen whether
Conference President Rena Lee and/or the subject area facilitator will
take the lead on suggesting and defining whatever terms might be
chosen, or whether outside action from NGOs, IGOs, or other groups can
contribute to a resolution.
The relationship between ABMTs and MPAs as categories also
retained some ambiguity. Canada suggested incorporating language on
other effective area-based conservation measures (OECMs) in several
places, which would be in line with the CBD Aichi Biodiversity Targets.
OECMs include multiple-use areas and fisheries closures, as well as
private, local, community-managed, or other forms of informal and/or
“de facto” protected areas [28]. Together with more strictly-protected
areas, they can contribute to networks of ABMTs and MPAs, but an
official definition of an OECM is lacking, further complicating the
ABMT/MPA definition issue. The IUCN World Commission on Protected
Areas has created a task force on the subject, which recently published a
Technical Report for Recognising and Reporting OECMs.7 Including
these areas significantly helped boost Canada’s progress towards
attaining the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, in both terrestrial and marine

6
The ABMT/MPA portion of the draft treaty (Part III) addresses the objec
tives of these sites (Article 14), international cooperation and coordination
(Article 15), identification of areas requiring protection (Article 16), proposals
(Article 17), consultation on and assessment of proposals (Article 18), decisionmaking (Article 19), implementation (Article 20), and monitoring and review
(Article 21)
7
IUCN WCPA Task Force on OECMs [35] Recognising and reporting other
effective area-based conservation measures, Gland, Switzerland: IUCN
(accessed 25 January 2020) [https://portals.iucn.org/library/node/48773].

5
See coverage on the CBD Meetings by the Earth Negotiations Bulletin [htt
ps://enb.iisd.org/vol09/enb09725e.html] and [https://enb.iisd.org/vol09
/enb09710e.html] and of the WIPO Session [https://www.wipo.int/meetings
/en/details.jsp?meeting_id¼50424] (all accessed 25 January 2020).
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4.3. Environmental impact assessments (EIAs)9

contexts [29], and as of 2019 they have surpassed the 10% target for
marine protection, and are currently at 13.81%.8 This category of
ABMTs can complement MPAs but is not a substitution for long-term,
effective conservation measures.
The underlying criteria to be used to justify designating ABMTs and
MPAs also continued to face disagreement, with some states hoping to
include climate change and ocean acidification considerations outright
(and even ocean noise pollution in a few cases) while others pushed
back, arguing that criteria such as vulnerability, fragility, sensitivity,
and slow recovery already take these pressures into account. A few
delegates preferred not having criteria outlined here at all, but leaving it
to the scientific/technical body to determine and then provide guide
lines. Debates over whether to include socioeconomic factors were less
prevalent than at the first two IGCs. As in previous IGCs, Eritrea gave an
explicit defense of including socioeconomic factors, an issue which the
delegate described as “close to our heart” (Working Group on ABMTs, 8/
21/19). Other key issues that arose in the discussions included whether
and where to include traditional knowledge from indigenous peoples
and local communities, and whether ABMTs and MPAs should be timebound and adjustable; the latter considerations were favored by Russia,
China and the USA.
Interestingly, as mentioned earlier, the ICPC emerged at IGC-3 as a
clear voice for the interests of its industry. In the ABMT/MPA discus
sions, their contributions to CRPs requested inclusion of language
acknowledging (1) the importance of “facilitation of international com
munications, in particular for small island developing states” (Article 14),
(2) their role as “sectoral stakeholders, such as the owners and operators of
existing and planned submarine cables” (Article 15), and (3) that proposals
include “the coordinates of submarine cables”, whether existing or plan
ned (Article 17). These proposed amendments to the draft text reflect the
general trend of UNCLOS as well, which recognizes the goal of facili
tating international communication in the preamble, and which
explicitly carves out rights for submarine cable laying in most maritime
zones.
The revised draft text for IGC-4 has moved the criteria on identifying
areas (Article 16) to an Annex, and it now includes language stipulating
a time duration for a proposed area and measures in proposals (Article
17). It also more clearly points to the scientific/technical body’s role in
reviewing proposals (Article 18) but is less clear about whether the
Conference of Parties will have the authority to take decisions on mat
ters related to ABMTs (Article 19).
Moving forward towards IGC-4, critical questions remain about how
to designate ABMTs and MPAs when relevant instruments/bodies
already exist and/or where they are lacking, as well as how these in
struments/bodies should coordinate with one another, e.g. the OSPAR
network of MPAs and closures under regional fisheries management
organizations [30]. The issue of adjacency also remains contentious, i.e.
what role will coastal states have in decision-making regarding the
adoption and implementation of ABMTs/MPAs adjacent to their mari
time territories, and how/will their views be taken into account?
Additionally, including some dynamic approaches to ABMTs and MPAs
in ABNJ, such as mobile and adaptive sites, could be a thoughtful and
practical way forward, which will continue be advocated by NGOs in the
next IGC [31].
Hurdles also remain with regard to language incorporating the pre
cautionary principle and ecosystem approach, which are both now
mentioned in Article 5 of the revised draft text, on general principles and
approaches. As evidenced by the quote at the start of this section from
the Swiss delegate, the ABMT and MPA portion of the discussion at IGC3 certainly highlighted the frustration felt by many that we should be
further advanced at this stage.

“The EIA decision lies with the state party – the whole process of
having an approval [by an international body] is not one that we
support.”
- Delegate from the European Union, Working Group on EIAs 8/22/19
Divisions between states on the proper conduct of environmental
impact assessments (EIAs) continued in the third round of negotiations.
Much of the conversation revolved around two areas of disagreement:
(1) what kind of authority a scientific/technical body would have
compared to states parties, and (2) whether the stages of an EIA should
be stipulated in the agreement or set out as (perhaps voluntary) guide
lines. Neither of these issues were new to IGC-3, but the need to
reconcile the disparate positions of states has become more acute as the
negotiations head into their final scheduled meeting. Some observers
suggested that this issue area has seen more progress towards consensus
agreements, but it may be simply that the decisions that need to be made
about the process are especially clear on this topic.
Most states were in agreement that states parties should be the ones
to decide whether an EIA is needed. This, however, is one of the few
points of general agreement. States could not agree on whether it was
necessary to include in the BBNJ agreement a description of activity or
ecosystem characteristics where an EIA would clearly be needed (this
list will be prepared by the Conference of Parties as voluntary guidelines
(Article 29)). Moreover, states were clearly divided on the process to be
followed should a state determine that an EIA was not necessary. Many
developing states, including the African Group, the G77/China, CLAM,
and the PSIDS, argued that if a state decided an EIA was not necessary,
they would need to provide evidence to support that decision. The US
and Canada claimed that the deciding state merely had to make the
information supporting that decision publicly available; CARICOM,
PSIDS, and others stated that the decision to forego an EIA should be
confirmed by the scientific/technical body; and Russia retained its op
position to the establishment of any kind of new decision-making body
throughout the BBNJ agreement. Article 49 of the draft text discusses the
scientific/technical body and highlights some of the possibilities under
discussion for this institution. While states are in agreement that such a
body should exist, the expertise necessary for its members and the
overall role of the body are still up for debate. With such a range of
positions and support, it is unclear how easily states will be able to
reconcile into any sort of compromise in the upcoming IGC-4.
Likewise, there was controversy over how specific the agreement
should be when it came to providing details for the conduct of EIAs. The
first of these debates dealt with the issue of scoping. There was a split on
whether states parties or the scientific/technical body should define the
scope of EIAs. From there, the states moved into a discussion on whether
socio-economic and cultural impacts should be included within the
scope, with CLAM and PSIDS in favor and the EU and others arguing
instead for a more general definition of scope. Similar issues arose on the
second day of EIA discussion, in determining the specificity of guidelines

9

The EIA portion of the draft treaty (Part IV) addresses objectives (Article 21
bis), the obligation to conduct EIAs (Article 22), the relationship between the
treaty and EIA processes under other agreements and bodies (Article 23),
thresholds and criteria for EIAs (Article 24), cumulative impacts (Article 25),
transboundary impacts (Article 26), areas identified as ecologically or biolog
ically significant or vulnerable (Article 27), strategic environmental assess
ments (Article 28), a list of activities that do or do not require an EIA (Article
29), screening (Article 30), scoping (Article 31), impact assessment and eval
uation (Article 32), mitigation, prevention and management of potential
adverse effects (Article 33), public notification and consultation (Article 34),
preparation and content of EIAs (Article 35), publication of reports (Article 36),
consideration and review of reports (Article 37), decision-making (Article 38),
monitoring (Article 39), reporting (Article 40) and review (Article 41)

8
See the Department for Fisheries and Oceans Canada website (accessed 25
January 2020) [http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/oceans/conservation/areas-zones/i
ndex-eng.html].
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to be provided for EIAs. Some states, including the African Group, G77/
China, CARICOM, CLAM, and the EU preferred a list of mandatory in
formation to be included in EIAs in the agreement. Russia called for an
annex with an indicative list, and the Republic of Korea called for a
detailed, voluntary list to be developed later. There was also a split on
who should be responsible for the reviewing of reports, states parties or
the scientific/technical body. This recurring debate about whether a
new body should be created and empowered with a review and/or
approval role sits at the heart of the EIA issue - who is in charge of
overseeing new activities in ABNJ? This represents a basic question
about institutional design: how much delegation of decision-making is
necessary or acceptable?
Because EIAs would likely create a new burden or regulatory hurdle
for private actors, the lack of diverse industry representation was
notable. But once again, the ICPC advocated tweaks to the draft text in
CRPs that would minimize obstruction of industry activities in general.
The ICPC emphasized the need for minimizing “duplicative and incon
sistent requirements” during discussions on the relationship of the draft
treaty to other instruments (Article 23), as well as the “expected contri
bution to sustainable development” with respect to the scope of the
agreement (Article 31). With respect to impact assessment and evalua
tion (Article 32), the ICPC suggested language indicating that the State
Party (or proponent) “shall be authorized to define a planned activity as to
include future contingencies, such as the maintenance and repair of subma
rine cables, which shall not require a separate environmental impact
assessment absent exceptional circumstances.”
Such disparate and entrenched positions on the authority of states
versus the authority of a scientific/technical body as yet to be created
indicates that agreement in IGC-4 may be hard to come by. Discussions
about the design of any scientific/technical body have been stymied by
disagreement about what its proper functions would be. Nor is it clear if
the working group will be able to come together on the important issue
of what should be included in an EIA, and if a detailed or more general
approach to such guidelines would be more favorable. While the general
agreement for a scientific/technical body is there, there remain many
details still to be worked out.

stewardship of 20% of the EEZs in the world - but only one of the
countries has an oceanographic vessel and only one has government
staff with expertise in oceanographic issues. This plea for a fulfillment of
capacity building and technology transfer from developing countries
was not something that developed countries necessarily were against
during IGC-3 either, though they in general were clear on it still having
to be voluntary and non-monetary. Especially Russia emphasized their
known position, under which cooperation between nations should be
strictly voluntary and without any kind of legal obligations. How much
the oxymoron “voluntary commitment” could be expected in practice
was not explicitly addressed in discussions, although many states
emphasized past or on-going transfer programs as examples of this.
Another contentious issue was the reference to “developing middleincome countries” in the draft text. This reference and whether or not
special attention should be given to those countries, was something that
especially the US, supported by Canada, was against. They stated that
“… special attention should be given to those most in need such as the LDCs –
[we] do not believe middle income countries face similar challenges and that
they should be singled out for special treatment in this regard” (Working
Group on CBTMT, 8/20/19). This was also reflected in the CRPs on
CBTT, where the US for example suggested striking out “… and devel
oping middle income countries” all four times that it was mentioned. The
EU and its member states similarly suggested striking it out, though only
twice, and Canada wanted it struck out once. Sri Lanka, however,
emphasized during the negotiations themselves that 73% of world’s
poor live in these countries and that they themselves would be one of
these countries in the near future, but have very poor knowledge and
technological ability to access and utilize MGRs. This was echoed by
Iran, which stated that they could not accept a deletion of this term, and
Palestine on behalf of the G77/China, who would not favor such dele
tion. Bangladesh and Togo also supported one other in retaining this
reference, and none of those that gave input in CRPs wanted it struck
out. One can speculate that a reason why the US opposed this, for
example, could be due to the World Bank’s classification system, which
places inter alia China and Russia in this category (upper middle income)
as well as India (lower middle income) [32].
The topic of CBTMT is closely connected to other aspects of the BBNJ
agenda as well. For example, support for MGR access is sometimes
described as a form of capacity building, while benefit sharing might
include the transfer of marine technology related to MGR utilization.
Developing states, especially SIDS, often argue that capacity building is
critical to their ability to monitor and enforce ABMTs, or to evaluate the
quality of EIAs. Despite these important connections, the CBTMT issue
area has made perhaps the least amount of progress since IGC-1. The
debate has not gotten more nuanced, and the issues have not been
revealed as more complex than anticipated. Rather, countries and co
alitions seem to be entrenching further into their existing positions,
placing themselves on either side of the monetary vs. non-monetary and
mandatory vs. voluntary figurative chasm.

4.4. Capacity building and transfer of marine technology (CBTMT)10
“Our group will put additional emphasis on topic of CBTMT – these
fine words are enshrined in UNCLOS but their implementation has
fallen far short of the expectations of developing countries.”
- Palestine on behalf of the G77/China, opening statement 8/19/19
At the previous IGC (IGC-2), the discussion about CBTMT had moved
toward whether it would be monetary vs. non-monetary, and mandatory
vs. voluntary, and delegates largely fell into traditional categories of
developed vs. developing states, with Russia and the US both strongly
favoring voluntary and non-monetary options [4]. During IGC-3, the
special circumstances of SIDS and LDCs were emphasized again to
answer these objections to putting money on the table, and the repre
sentative from the G77/China emphasized that “the idea here is to make
sure that all countries who want to fulfill their rights and obligations under
this instrument are able to and have the opportunity to have the capacity
building and technology they need to do just that” (Working Group on
CBTMT, 8/20/19). This is especially true, said a member of one of the
groups, if the aim is to reduce the scientific and technological gap be
tween developed and developing states. Tuvalu emphasized this in
pointing out that for instance the PSIDS in combination shared the

5. Conclusion
The new BBNJ agreement is intended to connect and coordinate
fragmented governance institutions to ensure the conservation and
sustainable use of marine biodiversity in ABNJ [33]. The debate on
cross-cutting issues, however, has revealed two major obstacles to
achieving coherence and synthesis among fragmented institutions. First,
the “should not undermine” commitment - detailed in our analysis of
IGC-2 [4] - has been consistently deployed throughout the four issue
areas to argue that a new BBNJ instrument should not be empowered
with any oversight or coordination functions in its relationship with
existing institutions. This means that biodiversity conservation in ABNJ
must be achieved without the BBNJ treaty itself exerting any direct
control over shipping or fishing activities. Second, the status of the BBNJ
as an ‘implementing agreement’ has only two precedents to rely on: the
Part XI agreement and the Fish Stocks Agreement, both referred to as

10
The CBTMT portion of the draft treaty (Part V) addresses overall objectives
(Article 42), cooperation in CBTMT (Article 43), modalities for CBTMT (Article
44), additional modalities for TMT (Article 45), types of CBTMT (Article 46),
and monitoring and review (Article 47)
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‘implementing agreements.’ But the Part XI agreement effectively fused
with UNCLOS, whereas the Fish Stocks Agreement is a freestanding
treaty. The discussions about the modalities of a BBNJ instrument
strongly suggest that delegates are anticipating an implementing
agreement akin to the Fish Stocks Agreement, such that non-members of
UNCLOS can fully participate. This represents a missed opportunity to
enhance the unity and coherence of the ocean governance regime, and to
promote universal participation by states .
Despite these structural limitations, a BBNJ instrument still has the
potential to be a valuable tool in achieving the goals of conservation and
sustainable use of biodiversity in ABNJ. The draft text provided prior to
IGC-3 was an important step towards a treaty, as is the revised draft text
released in November 2019. However, a substantial amount of intersessional work will be necessary prior to IGC-4 if the process is to fin
ish on schedule. To support progress in the negotiations, any intersessional meetings and conversations will have to seek new compro
mises and build consensus across a broad, and geographically distrib
uted, group of delegates. Several inter-sessional meetings that do not
directly address the BBNJ agenda, but do so obliquely, or that bring
together relevant actors, are already scheduled for the period before
IGC-4 in March 2020. These include, inter alia, the Our Ocean Confer
ence (October 2019, Norway), the Global Ocean Social Sciences meeting
(November 2019, France), the Ocean Sciences meeting of the American
Geophysical Union (November 2019, United States), and the World
Biodiversity Forum (February 2020, Switzerland), as well as a number of
less formal workshops organized by NGOs and IGOs. Bodies with over
lapping work (e.g. the ISA and CBD) will hold various issue-specific
meetings in the inter-sessional period, and the relevant WIPO commit
tee is slated to continue its work on IPR for genetic resources, with the
goal of submitting recommendations for a new instrument to the UN
General Assembly in 2021. Additional meetings with a BBNJ-specific
focus are currently being organized among small groups of actors, but
whether and how these meetings might supper intra- and intercoalitional compromises remains to be seen.
The emerging BBNJ agreement seems “stuck in the middle” in
several senses. While IGC-3 occurred just after the midpoint of sched
uled negotiations, the discussions themselves do not feel “halfway” to
wards a final agreement. And many topics remain stuck between the two
competing, and arguably opposite, principles of the Common Heritage
of Mankind and the Freedom of the Seas, including the implied and
hoped for monetary benefits that would emerge from the application of
the former with reference to the potential exploitation of MGRs. Finally,
the BBNJ agreement is intended to exist between the current suite of
fragmented governance institutions in a way that allows it to enhance
coordination and cooperation between them. But the commitment that a
new agreement should “not undermine” existing agreements has been
interpreted restrictively in many of the issue areas, increasing the like
lihood that the BBNJ is boxed into the spaces between agreements as
opposed to actively identifying and creating synergies between them.
Indeed, although most major coalitions favored the positive framing of
“promotes coherence and coordination” in Article 4(3), the revised draft
text for IGC-4 has eliminated this text. Thus, at this stage, it seems as if
the emergence of a new, effective, and consensus BBNJ agreement faces
structural obstacles and persistent disagreements, leaving it stuck in the
middle of the path between initiating and concluding this multi-year
process.

topic, the database will also be shared our. At that point, it will have
been properly coded and made possible for external users to navigate so
that it is both accessible and discoverable.
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